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DISCRETIONARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN LAW SCHOOL
EDUCATION AND LEGAL SCHOLARSHIP*

By

HARVEY

G.

FRIEDMAN**

INTRODUCTION

In the United States today, we are questioning some of the
fundamental underlying assumptions of criminal law and procedure and the administrative apparatus for their implementation.
We continually ask whether the criminal law is relevant to the
control of broad categories of behavior now within its purview,,
and whether instead of deterring crime, the law may be in some
instances a causal factor of criminality.2 We question the validity
of an administrative structure characterized by the label
"assembly-line justice,"3 which is to say no justice at all. This
examination is a necessary and important process which shall
and must continue on all fronts.
Reappraisal of the criminal justice system has revealed a
disparity between prevailing perceptions and reality. This dichotomy is perhaps most apparent with respect to the popular view
that the criminal process entails an open aboveboard contest between well-matched adversaries before an expert judge and a jury
of peers.' Although the nation is seemingly beguiled by the Perry
Mason image of criminal justice, in reality the criminal process
bears little resemblance to the adversative ideal and is more accurately described as a covert administrative process. In sum*The term "discretionary criminal justice" or "discretionary justice," used frequently
throughout this paper, was coined by Professor Kenneth Culp Davis. See K. DAVIS, note
12 infra. The term denotes and emphasizes the exercise of administrative discretion on
the part of state officials in the pretrial criminal justice process.
The author wishes to express his sincere gratitude to Professors Walter Gellhorn and
Peter L. Strauss of the Columbia University School of Law for their editorial comments.
**Assistant Professor of Law, University of Detroit School of Law; B.A., University of
Miami, 1961; J.D., University of Miami School of Law, 1965; J.S.D. CANDIDATE and
Kruelwich Fellow, Columbia University School of Law.
'See H. PACKER, THE LIMITS OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION (1968), particularly Part III;
E. SCHUR, CRIMES WITHOUT VICTIMS (1965).
"'[Plublic branding as the perpetrator of a specific 'criminal' act is a crucial step in
the individual's progress toward a criminal 'career.' " E. SCHUR, supra note 1, at 5.
'THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION OF JUSTICE,

TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS (1967) [hereinafter cited as KATZENBACH REPORT].

'Watson, On the Low Status of the CriminalBar: Psychological Contributionsof the
Law School, 43 TEx. L. REv. 289 (1965). "First of all, to laymen law is the adversary trial
process." Id. at 294.
'See NATIONAL ADVISORY COMMISSION ON CRIMINAL JUSTICE STANDARDS AND GOALS,
COURTS TASK FORCE REPORT 42-45 (1973) [hereinafter cited as COURTS REPORT].
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ming up this state of affairs, one commentator expressed the
following view:
The assumption that anyone accused of a crime in the United
States has a right to a full adversary trial of his guilt or innocence-with well prepared advocates for each side, carefully overseen by an able, even-handed judge, searching diligently for the
truth and satisfying all legal rules and safeguards-is fundamental
to the American system of justice and to the populace's confidence
in it. Yet, with few exceptions, this concept has become little more
than a still celebrated myth both in the folklore of the law and in
formal jurisprudence. Not only in Perry Mason dramas, but also in
real-life appellate court decisions, in the body of criminal law and
in urgent legal controversies, .

.

. there exists little in the way of

formal rules, high court pronouncements, or even informed legal or
public opinion to ensure that justice is done in the substitute way
that men and women are actually "tried" every day in American
courts.

The "substitute way" of "trying" a case referred to above is, of
course, the administrative process.
Indeed, most criminal cases are not resolved in the courtroom
but rather in the stationhouse, in the prosecutor's office, and in
the corridors of the courthouse. Today's criminal justice practice
is minimally adversary7 and primarily administrative, with probably 90 percent' of all cases being resolved administratively prior
to reaching the courtroom. 9 At present, plea bargaining in the
hallways of the courthouse is more likely to determine the fate of
the accused than is an adversary battle in the courtroom.
1L.

DOWNIE, JUSTICE DENIED 32-33 (1971).
According to a study by the President's Crime Commission, only about 8 percent of
the persons apprehended as suspects in index crimes were processed fully through formal
steps of a criminal prosecution. COURTS REPORT 15.
8Guilty pleas alone account for 90 percent of all convictions and a substantial percentage of guilty pleas are the product of plea bargaining. KATZENBAcH REPORT 9. This, taken
together with other forms of administrative disposition such as screening and diversion,
led the writers of the Courts Task Force Report to conclude that over 90 percent of all
cases are disposed of through the exercise of prosecutorial discretion. COURTS REPORT 16.
'Although persons pleading guilty, either as a product of a bargain or otherwise, do
go before the court, it is usually no more than an empty ritual ratification of the guilty
plea:
Although the participants and frequently the judge know that negotiation has taken place, the prosecutor and defendant must ordinarily go
through a court room ritual in which they deny that the guilty plea is the
result of any threat or promise. As a result there is no judicial review of the
propriety of the bargain-no check on the amount of pressure put on the
defendant to plead guilty.
7

KATZENBAcH REPORT 9.

The Courts Task Force Report reaches a similar conclusion, although no statistics
were available to demonstrate the point.
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The image of the adversary contest as a hallmark of American criminal justice is perpetuated not only in the lay world but
also in the curriculum of a great number of law schools. Some of
the most popular criminal law casebooks now in use fail to deal
with the problem of the informal criminal justice administrative
process.'" Although we must not lose sight of the litigated case,
we must bring into view the bulk of criminal cases which are
"litigated" informally in the administrative arena. At the present
time, a major part of the criminal process-the administrative
disposition of cases-is largely excluded from consideration in
law school. This omission derives in part from continuing overemphasis on the case method as a pedagogical device and, perhaps
more importantly, from the failure of criminal justice scholarship
to provide a viable alternative teaching method.
Legal education must incorporate the reality of the informal
disposition of criminal cases. To accomplish this goal, data must
be systematically gathered to form the basis for the development
of new teaching methods. Interdisciplinary research centers
should be established to study administrative criminal justice in
full detail, and law schools can and should be in the forefront in
the development of this research capability. Collection of empirical data will lead to the creation of new materials for teaching
criminal law, and, in turn, criminal law scholars will be in a
position to exert influence geared toward the development of a
structured administrative criminal law process. Such a process
will enhance the system of justice by providing a formalized
check upon the exercise of discretion by the state in this important area. Following a brief discussion of the present state of the
criminal justice process and how it is taught in the law schools,
we shall turn to considerations relevant to incorporating this process into the legal curriculum.
I. DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE
Some of the most important decisionmaking in the criminal
justice system is engaged in by nonjudicial personnel, particularly the prosecutor, who has been called "the most powerful
"According to Professor Pye, "Perkins is probably the most popular casebook now
being used . . . .Plea bargaining and prosecutorial discretion are covered in one sentence." Pye, Law School Training in CriminalLaw: A Teacher's Viewpoint, 3 AM. CRIM.
L.Q. 173, 174 (1965). A more recent casebook contains more extensive materials on prosecutorial discretion. However, it presents, for the most part, only extreme examples in
which judicial intervention was required and in which there are appellate opinions available. See S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS PROCESSES (1969).
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official in local government."" The most basic example of prosecutorial discretion inheres in the concept of "selective enforcement." Professor Davis describes it in the following words:
When an enforcement agency or officer has discretionary power
to do nothing about a case in which enforcement would be clearly
justified, the result is a power of selective enforcement. Such power
goes to selection of parties against whom the law is enforced and
selection of the occasions when the law is enforced. Selective enforcement may also mean selection of the law that will be enforced
and of the law that will not be enforced; an officer may enforce one
statute fully,
never enforce another, and pick and choose in enforc2
ing a third.1

The importance of prosecutorial discretion remains undiminished
following the enforcement decision. In many respects, the prosecutor is more important than the judge since it is the former who
decides whether a given defendant will go to trial or whether a
guilty plea will be accepted in lieu of a trial. 3
Prosecutorial discretion is exercised through a variety of
techniques, among which the principal ones are the following: (1)
screening: the exclusion of the case from the criminal process; 4
(2) charging:the determination of the formal legal grounds upon
which the case shall be predicated; 5 (3) plea bargaining: the
decision to accept a plea of guilty in exchange for either a lower
charge or a promise by the prosecutor to recommend a lower
sentence than might otherwise be expected;" and (4) diversion:
the determination to halt or suspend formal criminal proceedings
(after the case is screened into the system but before conviction)
on the condition or assumption that the accused will do some"Baker, The Prosecutor-Initiationof Prosecution,23 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 770, 771
(1933).

' 2K. DAVIS, DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE: A PRELIMINARY INQUIRY 163 (1969). Of course, the

police and corrections officials also exercise extensive decisionmaking power. For excellent
studies of the exercise of police discretion, see J. SKOLNICK, JUSTICE WITHOUT TRIAL: LAW
ENFORCEMENT IN A DEMOCRATIC SOCIETY (1966); Goldstein, Police Policy Formulation:A
Proposal for Improving Police Performance, 65 MICH. L. REV. 1123 (1967); McGowan,
Rule-Making and the Police, 70 MICH. L. REV. 659 (1972).
13L. DOWNIE, supra note 6, at 185-86.
"CouRTS REPORT

16, 17-26.

"Although the charge process is distinct from the plea negotiation, the two
are closely related by the prosecutor's expectations at the time of charge as
to the likely course bargaining will take, and by the important role bargaining for reduced charges plays in the exercise of the prosecutor's discretion.
KATZENBACH REPORT 11. Charging was not dealt with as a distinct process in the Courts
Task Force Report.
"CouRTS REPORT 42-65.
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thing (undergo treatment, for example) in return. 7 With some
exceptions, 8 the preceding determinations are made unilaterally
by the prosecutor. These critical decisions, affecting the great
bulk of criminal cases, are neither confined, 9 structured, 0 nor
checked"' by anyone (with the exception of the actual plea bargain, in which instance the court's role is generally little more
than a pro forma ratification of the prosecutor's decision)."2 These
decisions are secluded from public scrutiny and, in many instances, from other actors within the criminal justice system, including persons within the prosecutor's own office."
Few modern thinkers would take issue with the fact that
discretion plays an inevitable part within any legal system. Although ideals are often framed in terms of the preeminence of the
rule of law over the notion of discretion, 5 discretion must inevitably exist at every level:
'"Id. at 27-41.
'"In some jurisdictions the police still make some of the discretionary decisions usually
reserved for the prosecutor. This is particularly true in the lower courts. The practice has
been criticized by a number of reports, the most recent of which is the Courts Task Force
Report. The grand jury, of course, has a screening function in some jurisdictions, but the
prosecutor generally controls those functions through his presentments to the grand jury.
The prosecutor has also been forced to commence an action or to stop it through judicial
intervention, but these cases are extreme examples. An interesting selection of such cases
on the control of prosecutorial discretion is presented in S. KADISH & M. PAULSEN, supra
note 10, at 1072-99.
'""By confining [discretion] is meant fixing the boundaries and keeping discretion
within them." K. DAvis, supra note 12, at 55. It generally involves rulemaking "to replace
vagueness with clarity." Id. at 57.
2"[1R]ules which establish limits on discretionary power confine it, and rules which
specify what the administrator is to do within the limits structure the discretionary
power." Id. at 97.
2
"Checking" refers to someone inspecting another's decision. Id. at 142-43.
21KATZENBACH REPORT 9.
23

1See K. DAVIS, supra note 12.
"Rule of law may be defined as:
The absolute supremacy or predominance of regular law as opposed to the
influence of arbitrary power [excluding] the existence of arbitrariness, of
prerogative, or even of wide discretionary authority on the part of the Government.
K. DAVIS, supra note 12, at 31, quoting from A. DIEY, THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTON 198

(1915).
"Discretion has been defined as:
[Aln authority conferred by law to act in certain conditions or situations
in accordance with an official's or an official agency's own considered judgment and conscience. It is an idea of morals, belonging to the twilight zone
between law and morals.
Pound, Discretion, Dispensation and Mitigation: The Problem of the Individual Special
Case, 35 N.Y.U.L. REv. 925, 926 (1960). On a less abstract plane, discretion has been
defined in the following terms:
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Every governmental and legal system in world history has involved both rules and discretion. No government has ever been a
government of-laws and not of men in the sense of eliminating all
discretionary power. Every government has always been a government of laws and of men."

The dangers in a departure from the ideal of the rule of law are
well expressed on the stone facade of the Department of Justice
building in Washington, D.C., where the words "Where law ends,
tyranny begins" are engraved. With respect to this aphorism,
however, Professor Davis points out that:
[1]n our system of government, where law ends tyranny need not
begin. Where law ends, discretion begins, and the exercise of discretion may mean either beneficence or tyranny, either justice or injustice, either reasonableness or arbitrariness. 7

American jurisprudence is, nonetheless, filled with forebodings concerning the exercise of discretion. Pound, for example,
noted that:
From beginning to end of a prosecution we must rely upon the discretion of officials. But in criminal law the dangers involved in discretion are obvious. All discretion is liable to abuse, and the consequences of abuse, affecting the general security on the one side, and
life or liberty on the other side, are much more serious than in civil
controversies."

Several serious dangers inhere in the predominant reliance on
administrative decisionmaking reflected in the criminal justice
system. Informality and invisibility in the system of nontrial
administrative disposition give rise
to fears that it does not operate fairly or that it does not accurately
identify those who should be prosecuted and what disposition should
be made in their cases. Often important decisions are made without
adequate information, without sound policy guidance or rules, and
without basic procedural protections for the defendant, such as
counsel or judicial consideration of the issues. Because these dispositions are reached at an early stage, often little factual material is
available about the offense, the offender, and the treatment alternatives. No record reveals the participants, their positions, or the reason for or facts underlying the disposition. When the disposition
A public officer has discretion whenever the effective limits on his power
leave him free to make a choice among possible courses of action or inaction.
K. DAVIS, supra note 12, at 4.
For a comprehensive discussion of the controversy between the exponents of the rule
of law and those who favor a discretionary view of the administration of law, see K. DAvis,
supra note 12.
2
1K. DAVIS, supra note 12, at 17.
zld. at 3.
2
'R. POUND, CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN AMERICA 75 (1930).
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involves dismissal of filed charges or the entry of a guilty plea, it is
likely to reach court, but only the end product is visible, and that
view often is misleading. There are disturbing opportunities for coercion and over-reaching, as well as for undue leniency. The very
informality and flexibility of the procedures are sources both of potential usefulness and of abuse.2 9

Even more basic dangers involve concepts of fair warning, notice,
and equality of treatment. 0
The real and apparent dangers inherent in a system of justice
which relies predominantly on informal administrative procedures for the disposition of the fate of offenders who invoke its
machinery deserve our full and critical attention and scrutiny.
Controls must be placed on the exercise of discretion. Certainly
the judiciary has been sensitive to this issue, and landmark cases
of the last decade attest to that concern. 3' Yet these cases, important as they are, turn on issues which form only the tip of the
iceberg of administrative discretion. The great mass of cases disposed of through selective enforcement remains hidden from review. The need for an "administrative law" to regulate discretionary decisionmaking is apparent. 2 Traditional administrative
law, which most often concerns itself with the regulation of economic behavior, in part reflects an attempt to bring discretion
closer to the rule of law. Analogously, a similar body of principles
should be developed with which to regulate the nonjudicial and
low visibility operations of criminal law. In the words of Professor
Goldstein:
REPORT 4.
'Under the rule of law, the criminal law has both a fair-warning function
for the public and a power-restricting function for officials. Both post-.and
pre-verdict sanctions, therefore, may be imposed only in accord with authorized procedures. No sanctions are to be inflicted other than those which have
been prospectively prescribed by the constitution, legislation, or judicial
decision for a particular crime or a particular kind of offender. These concepts, of course, do not preclude differential disposition, within the authorized limits, of persons suspected or convicted of the same or similar offenses.
In an ideal system differential handling, individualized justice, would result,
but only from an equal application of officially approved criteria designed
to implement officially approved objectives. And finally a system which
presumes innocence requires that preconviction sanctions be kept at a minimum consistent with assuring an opportunity for the process to run its
course.
Goldstein, Police Discretion not to Invoke the Criminal Process: Low-Visibility Decisions
in the Administration of Justice, 69 YALE L.J. 544, 547-51 (1960).
"See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S.
478 (1964); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Wong Sun v. United States, 371
U.S. 471 (1963); Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
"See generally Remington, Book Review, 55 Nw. U.L. REv. 505 (1960).
"KATZBACH
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A regularized system of review is a requisite for insuring substantial
compliance by the administrators of criminal justice with these ruleof-law principles. Implicit in the word "review" and obviously essential to the operation of any review procedure is the visibility of the
decisions and conduct to be scrutinized."

How law schools might contribute to such a development is the
subject of the remainder of this paper.

II.

DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE AND THE CRIMINAL LAW CURRICULUM

The failure to develop an administrative law for the control
of discretionary justice in the criminal process is inextricably
intertwined with the focus of the present day law school criminal
justice curriculum and the failure of legal scholarship to transcend the severe strictures imposed by that curriculum. Traditionally, criminal law has been treated as the poor relation of
legal education, getting short shrift in a single first-year 3-hour
course. Many law schools have acknowledged that the traditional role of criminal justice in the curriculum has not been its
proper one, and as a result criminal law has enjoyed increased
prosperity in recent years.3 4 Yet the major quantitative changes
are still to come as evidenced by the fact that criminal law
courses in American law schools still comprise only 5 to 10 percent of the overall curriculum, while in Europe such education
often exceeds 30 percent.The truly significant changes, however, must be qualitative,
and in terms of quality, criminal justice legal education is sadly
lacking. This shortcoming is not so much a consequence of what
is taught as opposed to what is not taught. To the extent that the
criminal justice curriculum fails to take into account the concept
of "discretionary justice"-the process responsible for the disposition of the great bulk of criminal cases-it must be considered
fundamentally inadequate. Highlighting the need for incorporating the study of the discretionary justice process into the criminal
justice curriculum is in no way intended to denigrate the importance of teaching traditional criminal law and procedure. Substantive criminal law will and should retain a central role in the
teaching process because of the obvious relevance of substantive
"Goldstein, supra note 30, at 550.
"Remington, Growing Involvement in CriminalJustice Administration, 1968 Wis. L.
REV. 355.
'Kadish, Roundtable on Criminal Law, 20 J. LEGAL ED. 426, 433 (1968). In 1965,
Professor Pye estimated that only 5 to 7 percent of the total law school curriculum was
devoted to criminal law. Pye, supra note 10, at 178.
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issues to the administrative process concerning the dispensation
of criminal justice:
The issue is not, therefore, whether to continue to teach the
substantive criminal law and criminal process, but is rather how it
ought to be taught and how much emphasis it ought to be given in
relation to . . . discretionary justice."

The teaching of discretionary justice will complement but not
supplant traditional criminal law in the curriculum. Understanding of each will be enriched by exposure to the other.
What, then, are the reasons for the failure to incorporate
"discretionary justice" into the criminal justice curriculum? In
part, it relates to the limited time afforded criminal justice in the
overall curriculum due to the competition with other materials
traditionally considered to be of greater import. Perhaps a more
fundamental reason is the long tradition of the case method as
the primary teaching device in legal education.
The criminal law course, through a study of cases and statutes, has traditionally been employed at least as much for initiating the first-year law student into the rites of doctrinal analysis
as for any other purpose. Yet the case method yields only the
most limited insights into the problems inherent in discretionary
justice. Appellate review is an ad hoc process, unplanned and
unsystematic. Courts do not actively ferret out actual or potential
abuses, and therefore appellate decisions do not necessarily accurately reflect the problems which beset a particular process."
They tell only part of the story, and the law student, learning by
virtue of the case method, can only discover the part of the story
which the cases reveal.18 Even if appellate review were more systematically comprehensive, the assumptions implicit in the decisions made by those who administer the criminal law cannot
always be discerned from an analysis of appellate decisions, but
"Remington, supra note 32, at 506.
""The judiciary, under our conception of separation of powers, is not given the task
of comprehensive substantive revision." Cohen, Criminal Law Legislation and Legal
Scholarship, 16 J. LEGAL ED. 253, 266 (1964).
Questions of great significance . . . have been left for decision to
the courts on a case by case basis. Whether an issue is dealt with therefore
depends less upon its significance than upon the accident of whether it comes
to the attention of an appellate court.
Until very recent years issues of major importance to police and correctional agencies were not given sustained attention in the law schools unless
the issues were reflected in appellate decisions.
Remington, The Law, the Law School, and Criminal Justice Administration, 43 Tax. L.
Rav. 275, 282 (1965).
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can only be studied
through analysis of human behavior at an
39
empirical level.
In 1955, Professor Wechsler recognized the bondage of legal
scholarship to the litigated case and suggested that legal scholarship could contribute significantly to the development of the law
by systematically focusing on legislative questions, marshalling
analysis, and research to the legislative problems of its field; it has
important special competence that should be brought to bear on
formulating legislative policies entitled, on the merits, to prevail.
The thesis . . . has especial relevance today, for we are living in an
age that may well prove to be the greatest legislative age in the
entire history of man. 0

What Professor Wechsler had to say in the fifties on the need to
focus on legislative problems remains equally applicable today.
But at least as applicable today is the need to focus on the discretionary justice process. The program for criminal justice scholarship in the seventies will focus on the confining, structuring, and
checking of discretionary justice.
In this context, the problem for legal education goes beyond
over-reliance on the case method to considerations concerning
what is to replace it. An alternative is understandably difficult
to develop because discretion, the central pivot on which these
issues turn, is by its nature elusive and not readily amenable to
empirical analysis. Adequate teaching materials to deal with low
visibility administrative decisionmaking in criminal justice do
not presently exist. The first step is to gather information which
can serve as a basis for the development of teaching materials.
Certainly the myriad studies published by both governmental and private entities are insufficient. While they are utilized
in a variety of new casebooks, these studies can do little more
than point out the problems involved. Such reports, whether published in the form of broad suggestions or more authoritative
black-letter standards, are predicated largely upon educated
guesses modified by the degree of political compromise necessary
to get them into print. Common sense and horse trading are insufficient bases for the formulation of policy in an area in which
fundamental rights of both the individual and society are in
jeopardy.
Problems related to the administration of discretionary justice require application of a methodology which has rarely been
I"Mause, Book Review, 84

HARV. L. REV. 504, 515 (1970).
'"Wechsler, Legal Scholarship and CriminalLaw, 9 J. LEGAL ED. 18, 28 (1956).

1974

DISCRETIONARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE

employed by either public or private entities or by legal scholars.
This methodology transcends the scope of present day legal research methods. As Professor Kadish has observed, even the studies conducted by the American Bar Foundation are
only a selected beginning of recording systematically the basic data
with respect to the day to day functioning of the agencies of criminal
justice which are indispensable to any meaningful reform.
Only through such [interdisciplinary and empirical] studies
are revealed the ways in which working administrative adaptions are
made to the criminal law system, such as the short-circuiting process of the guilty plea or the diversion of sentencing determinations
to the prosecutor. And only through such studies can we accurately
perceive the principles and structures of law which have become
functionless or dysfunctional, the gaps between effective legal restraint and the exercise of authority and the implication upon a
subtle and sometimes unpredictably interconnected system of
changes at any single point.'

Pound's observation made 45 years ago that American law
schools could aid in the improvement of criminal justice "with
the facilities already at hand and with the methods of which our
law teachers are already masters"4 is no longer applicable. 3
The task for legal scholarship with respect to "discretionary
justice" is twofold: one, to provide satisfactory teaching materials; and two, to provide an adequate conceptual basis upon which
reforms of the process of discretionary justice may be predicated.
The latter aspect is of especial significance. Unless an "administrative law" is developed for the criminal justice administrative
agencies to curb actual and potential abuses of discretionary decisionmaking, the state may eventually become saddled through
judicial intervention with a correlative of the exclusionary rule.44
Legal scholarship has the opportunity and perhaps the responsibility to add to the development of such an administrative
law as it has the responsibility to produce appropriate teaching
"Kadish, supra note 35, at 431.
"Pound, What Can Law Schools Do for CriminalJustice, 12 IOWA L. Rxv. 105, 106
(1927).
"Kadish, supra note 35, at 433.
"The exclusionary rule, intended by the Supreme Court to affect future police incustody interrogation practices, has not had the desired effect:
In part this is so because many police departments never even learn of
what the court has said in such cases [Escobedo]. In part it results from
the difficulty in translating the requirements of judicial decisions into workable police practices which will conform to such requirements.
Remington, supra note 38, at 284. Of whatever value the exclusionary rule might be in
modifying administrative behavior, it would appear that internal controls are superior to
a negative sanction imposed externally.
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materials. The question then becomes one of determining how
legal scholarship can best proceed to achieve these ends.
III.

INCORPORATING DISCRETIONARY JUSTICE INTO THE CURRICULUM

A meaningful approach to discretionary justice requires "at
the minimum-a facility of interpreting behavioral research
and-optimally-an ability to conduct such research . . .legal
educators should confront this fact and begin to restructure curricula." 45 Legal scholars must develop skills in the area of social
science research, allowing them to work closely with behavioral
scientists and, ultimately, enabling them to employ systematic
data gathering techniques within the law school context.4" Professor Kadish has summed up this proposition in this manner:
Training in social science methodology for law teachers, bringing social and behavioral scientists on to law faculties, close working
affiliation between law schools and social scientists in other departments of the universities, establishment of institutes in connection
with law schools which can provide an organized structure to provide interdisciplinary research of this kind-there are precedents for
each of these methods in the law school world today.
What is important is that they be moved from the periphery to
the center of law school research efforts in the criminal law.
Course work would certainly continue, but the materials would
transcend the study of cases, the statutes, doctrines and principles.
The operational research work of the law teacher would itself become the subject of study, its insights, its discoveries, its methodologies and its consequences, and systematic study of the methodology
and substance of the behavioral sciences would also find its proper
place.
In addition, law schools would cultivate lines of affiliation with
other departments of the universities in education as well as research. Programs of combined education, leading to both the LL.B.
and the Ph.D. whether in sociology, social psychology, criminology
or other fields, offer a potential not yet actually explored."

The Vera Institute of Justice in New York City can serve as
a model of the type institute called for to provide an organized
structure for interdisciplinary research and study at a law school,
and the establishment of institutes similar to Vera might go a
I'Mause, supra note 39, at 515.
""One of the skills that legal scholars in criminal law must develop ... is the ability
to achieve a working relationship with persons in the behavioral sciences." Cohen, supra
note 37, at 269. "Systematic observation, surveys, interviews, experimentation, data
collection-these techniques and methods will have somehow to be brought within the law
schools." Kadish, supra note 35, at 431.
"Kadish, supra note 35, at 431-32.

1974

DISCRETIONARY CRIMINAL JUSTICE

long way towards achieving the goals mentioned by Professor
Kadish. s While Vera is not affiliated with a law school, its structure and operational scheme should be examined with a view
towards establishing similar organizations to work closely with or
within law schools. While such organizations require funding,
their spinoff projects can in large part be self-supporting through
consulting and other arrangements.
Instead of consulting independently for criminal justice
agencies, professors might well work through an institute at their
own law school and thus make their work more observable to
students. In addition, a Vera type of operation could bring social
scientists into closer collaboration with the law school (without
necessarily bringing them onto the faculty) and thereby afford
both law students and professors a better opportunity to study
social scientific methodology firsthand. The affiliation of social
scientists with law schools would assure access to the more specialized empirical research knowledge which lawyers generally do
not possess. It would assure as well that the legal scholar will not
be burdened with the more technical methodological aspect of the
studies, thereby making his talents available to identify policy
problems and allowing him to make the necessary value judgments as to the application of the results of the studies
undertaken.
The social scientist can participate not only in legal research
but in the teaching of law as well. Similarly, students from other
disciplines in the university can be brought into the law school
classroom as regular students in the criminal justice curriculum.
The benefits to both the law students and the students from other
disciplines who jointly engage in criminal justice research is
clear.49
1rhe Vera Institute of Justice has been praised by numerous individuals and entities
dealing with criminal justice problems, especially for its pioneering work in release on
recognizance progriams which have successfully demonstrated a viable alternative to
money bail. While the Institute has restricted its activities to New York City, other
projects predicated on the Vera model have been established in cities throughout the
United States. Vera's work with public drunkeness in the Manhattan Bowery Project and
its study of diversion through the Manhattan Court Employment Project have also met
with notable success. A Vera-like organization has been established in Cleveland, and as
is Vera, it is a private foundation unaffiliated with any academic institution. The Vera
Institute is a wholly private research foundation, begun in 1961 through a generous endowment by a private citizen and aided financially by the Ford Foundation. For a detailed
description of the Institute's history, goals, and future plans, see PROGRAMS IN CRIMINAL
JUSTICE REFORM, VERA INSTITUTE OF JUSTICE TEN-YEAR REPORT 1961-1971 (1972).

"George, The Imperative of Modernized CriminalLaw Teaching, 53 Ky. L.J. 461, 468
(1965).
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The interdisciplinary approach employing social scientists
and their methodology undoubtedly will be the primary tool for
legal education and teaching in the area of discretionary justice
in the future. Other techniques, however, should not be excluded
from consideration.5
While not all law school graduates will become involved in
the criminal justice process, most of those who operate the process are lawyers. The majority of legislators, most judges, and all
prosecutors and defense attorneys are law school trained. The
influence of law schools on the criminal justice process is, therefore, decisive. The lesson the law student must learn through the
criminal justice curriculum is one which can provide the theoretical underpinning necessary for the later development of discretionary justice concepts when the students later serve as legislators, judges, defense attorneys, and, most importantly, as
prosecutors.
The need for infusion of a behavioral science approach into
the criminal justice curriculum should not be confused with the
adoption of a clinical approach. While clinical observations are a
part of the behavioral science methodology, behavioral science
methodology is not necessarily a part of a clinical approach. The
value of clinical education or practice programs as a tool in legal
education is not in issue here. What is desperately needed is the
kind of strictly structured inquiry which is the hallmark of behavioral science methodology. Casual clinical observations involved
in visiting a prison or courthouse are certainly in order but do not
lead to this end. While such exposure may point up the disparity
between the classroom lesson and the real life situation, it should
only be an incidental part of the educational experience. Even
clinical course work (where the student works through a problem)
has negligible value to social scientific inquiry, since general observations of the overall process cannot be validly extrapolated
from such isolated contacts. The best opportunities for valid generalizations are afforded by the rigid controls inherent in a formally structured social scientific inquiry.
'Professor Mueller, for example, has called for the inclusion of comparative law in
the criminal justice curriculum, contending that while foreign law is not necessarily superior to ours, it does offer a vantage point from which to make a better evaluation of our
own process. Mueller, The Teaching of ComparativeLaw in the Course on CriminalLaw,
11 J. LEGAL ED. 59 (1958). Studies of West German criminal law indicate that the prosecutor's discretion can be very limited and still be effective. K. DAvIs, supra note 12, at 19195. Professor George suggests that "one of the best ways to study your own system is to
study another's." George, supra note 49, at 473.
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Also, the benefits of student participation in clinical education must be balanced against the time strictures placed on the
curriculum. Empirical study is ordinarily a long term affair which
often requires followup to determine the reliability and validity
of the results. The law student is not in attendance at the law
school long enough to see most such studies through to completion. Thus, while he should be imbued with the concept of methodology and its applications, pedagogical considerations dictate
that ordinarily he will receive only the end product through the
curriculum. As a result, empirical study will be conducted by the
legal scholar for the benefit of the law student and, of course, for
the benefit of the criminal justice process and society at large.
CONCLUSION

For the most part, the nation's criminal justice process is
predicated not on the adversary model but, instead, on the discretionary justice model. Neither legal scholarship nor legal education reflect that fact. This disparity between what is taught in law
school and what actually transpires in the process must be eliminated if we are to make the criminal justice process effective both
in terms of protecting individual liberties and in terms of maintaining order and security in the society.
At the heart of discretionary justice lies the idea that for
every doctrine or principle of the criminal law there is an underlying mechanical process for its implementation. That process has
both visible and invisible parts. The invisible parts are those
which involve the exercise of discretion by criminal justice officials. Insofar as the exercise of discretion remains unconfined,
unstructured, and unchecked, it has the power to devastate every
principle and doctrine of the law.
Legal scholarship must move forward in preserving those
doctrines and principles of law meriting retention by illuminating
for the law student, in particular, and for the criminal process,
in general, what is now shrouded in darkness. While the case
method does not have to be abandoned to achieve this end, it does
have to be preempted in part and supplemented. Primarily, this
will require the inclusion of social scientific techniques into criminal justice scholarship and education. In the end, the legal
scholar and the law school, through their students, can have a
profound influence on the process of discretionary justice.

